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Introduction
Opinion 2/13 of the European Court of Justice on the European Union’s
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights has dealt a severe blow
to the ambitions of the EU and the Council of Europe to put the relations between
the Union and the Convention system on a sure and formal footing.1 The Court
of Justice held numerous aspects of the Draft Accession Agreement2 to be
incompatible with the Treaties. Accession therefore cannot go ahead as planned.
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Association of European Law at King’s College London on 23 April 2015; thank you to all
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anonymous reviewers for their very useful suggestions and Emily Hancox for research support. All
errors are, of course, my own.
1ECJ 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
2Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (47 + 1(2013)008rev2) (hereafter: DDA).
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In fact, the Court has erected some formidable obstacles for any move towards
accession and it has been argued that Article 6(2) TEU, which places the Union
under a duty to accede, is now a dead letter.3 It is the purpose of this article to
explore whether and how accession could still be achieved and if, in light of the
Court of Justice’s demands, it can still be maintained that it would improve the
human rights protection of individuals in the EU. The argument proceeds in four
steps: first, the article outlines the basic tenets of the Draft Accession Agreement
and the background to Opinion 2/13; second, it explores the technical options
available to overcome the hurdles to accession; third, it provides a diagnosis of the
shortcomings identified by the Court and proposes possible solutions; and fourth,
it questions whether, in light of these proposed solutions, accession can still be
considered desirable.
Background
Article 6(2) TEU places the EU under a legal obligation to accede.4 This competence
is accompanied by a number of caveats, which are central to Opinion 2/13.
Article 6(2) TEU itself provides that ‘accession shall not affect the Union’s
competences as defined in the Treaties’, which is fleshed out further by Protocol No. 8
to the Lisbon Treaty. As will be shown, the Court of Justice not only interpreted these
written limits very broadly, but also extended unwritten constitutional doctrines,
leading the Draft Agreement to fail at a number of hurdles.
Key features of the Draft Accession Agreement
Before addressing the Opinion and its consequences in more detail, it is necessary
to briefly introduce key aspects of the Draft Agreement. The Draft Agreement
takes account of the EU’s executive federalism, i.e. the role of the member states as
the entities mainly responsible for implementing EU law, and the fact that after
accession, both the EU and its member states would be parties to the European
Convention. For an applicant before the European Court of Human Rights this
could result in considerable difficulty to decide which entity – EU or member
state – was responsible for a violation of the Convention, as it cannot always be
easily determined whether the exact legal basis for member state action is a rule of
domestic law or of EU law.
3F. Picod, ‘La Cour de justice a dit non à l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention
EDH’, La Semaine Juridique – Édition Générale (2015) p. 230 at p. 234.
4This had become necessary after the ECJ had held in Opinion 2/94 that accession could not be
based on Art. 235 TEC (now Art. 352 TFEU) because the implications of accession would be of
constitutional significance and could thus only be brought about by way of Treaty amendment: ECJ
28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94, Accession to the ECHR, paras. 34-35.
240 Tobias Lock EuConst 11 (2015)
In order to avoid these problems the Draft Agreement contains a rule of attribution
in Article 1(4) according to which an ‘act, measure or omission of organs of a member
State of the European Union […] shall be attributed to that State, even if such act,
measure or omission occurs when the State implements the law of the European
Union, including decisions taken under the [Treaty on European Union] and under
the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]’. Conduct is only attributed
to the EU where there was no member state involvement. In order to include the EU
or the member states in EU-related proceedings the drafters devised the status of
co-respondent.5 The co-respondent is a party to the case, so that it would be bound by
the decision of the Court and enjoys the same procedural position as the respondent.6
In light of the rule on attribution, most cases would initially be directed against a
member state. Where this is so, Article 3(2) of the Draft Agreement provides that:
the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in respect of
an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into
question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of
European Union law […].
The Draft Accession Agreement provides further for the involvement of co-
respondent(s) if the initial application is directed against the EU where an alleged
violation ‘calls into question the compatibility with the [Convention] rights at issue [...]
of a provision of the [Treaties]’.7 The decision to become a co-respondent would be
voluntary. A potential co-respondent either accepts an invitation from the European
Court of Human Rights or makes a request to be joined to the proceedings as co-
respondent. In the latter case the Draft Agreement provides for the Court of Human
Rights to assess whether ‘it is plausible that the conditions [for the co-respondent
status] are met.’8
If a violation is found the respondent and co-respondent(s) would normally be
jointly responsible.9 The drafters considered this solution capable of avoiding an
infringement of the autonomy of EU law given that the co-respondent mechanism
could be seen as preventing the Court of Human Rights from making internally
binding pronouncements on the division of competences between the Union and
the member states.10 As the following discussion of Opinion 2/13 will show, the
Court did not consider this to be the case.
5See Art. 3(1) DAA.
6On the differences to third party intervention cf. T. Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR:
Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg’, 35 European Law Review (2010) p. 777 at p. 785-786.
7Art. 3(3) DAA.
8Art. 3(5) DAA.
9Art. 3(7) DAA; on the exception see infra.
10See the European Commission’s arguments in Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 82.
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The rule on attribution would result, in most cases, in the need to exhaust the
domestic remedies in the member state to which the conduct is attributed.11 These
proceedings may result in a request for a preliminary reference to the Court of
Justice in cases in which the interpretation or validity of EU law is at issue.12 As the
parties to the proceedings before a national court cannot force it to request a
reference, there is a potential gap in the involvement of the Court of Justice even
where a preliminary reference would be mandatory. The Court of Justice
considered this to be problematic with regard to the subsidiarity of the European
Court of Human Rights’s jurisdiction and demanded that ‘external review by the
Convention institutions can be preceded by effective internal review by the courts
of the Member States and/or of the Union’.13 In order to involve the Court of
Justice in such cases, Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement provides:
In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the Court of
Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the
[Convention] rights at issue [...] of the provision of European Union law as under
paragraph 2 of this Article, sufficient time shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of
the European Union to make such an assessment, and thereafter for the parties to
make observations to the Court. The European Union shall ensure that such
assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the Court are not unduly
delayed. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.
The exact ramifications of this involvement at EU level were to be laid down in
EU-internal rules.
The extension of autonomy in Opinion 2/13
The key theme in Opinion 2/13 is the autonomy of EU law. In the context of
external relations, a summary of the Court’s classic position on the autonomy
principle can be found in Opinion 1/00:
Preservation of the autonomy of the [Union] legal order requires therefore, first, that
the essential character of the powers of the [Union] and its institutions as conceived
in the Treaty remain unaltered […].
Second, it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the
rules of the […] Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the effect of
11See Art. 34 ECHR.
12Art. 267 TFEU.
13Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the
accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, available at <www.curia.europa.eu>, visited 10 August 2015.
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binding the [Union] and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers,
to a particular interpretation of the rules of [Union] law referred to in that
agreement.14
It follows from this that an international court must not interpret EU law if such
interpretation would carry binding effects. This could be seen clearly in Reynolds,
where the Court held that the power of a United States District Court to decide
whether under EU law the Commission was capable of bringing proceedings
against tobacco producers in a United States court did not constitute an
infringement of the autonomy of EU law because ‘a decision by a United States
court as to the Commission’s power to bring legal proceedings before it is not
capable of binding the Community and its institutions to a particular
interpretation of the rules of Community law in the exercise of their internal
powers. […] such a decision would be binding only in relation to the specific
proceedings.’15 This was the received wisdom at the time the Accession Agreement
was drafted.16
Moreover, the Court held in Kadi that an international agreement cannot have
the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the Treaties.17 It further
added in Opinion 1/09 that it was impossible for a Union agreement to replace the
jurisdiction of member state courts as ‘ordinary courts’ within the EU legal order
with that of an international court.18
A narrow conception of autonomy, such as this, is appropriate as it serves the
legitimate purpose of protecting the integrity of the EU law while retaining the EU’s
capacity as an external actor. TheDraft Agreement is the product of an effort to create
a functioning system of judicial review by the European Court of Human Rights of
alleged violations of the European Convention by the EU while ensuring that it
stayed within the limits defined by the Court of Justice.19 However, in Opinion
2/13, the Court of Justice moved the goalposts and, without expressly admitting it,
extended the meaning of the autonomy of EU law by first adopting an extremely
narrow view of the meaning of ‘interpretation of EU law’; second, by elevating
mutual recognition to the status of a constitutional principle; and third, by largely
ignoring the express duty for the Union to accede laid down in Article 6(2) TEU.
14ECJ 18 April 2002, Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement between the European Community and
non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, paras. 12-13.
15ECJ 12 September 2006, Case C-131/03 P, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. and Others v
Commission of the European Communities, para. 102.
16For details see T. Lock, ‘Walking on a tightrope: The draft ECHR accession agreement and the
autonomy of the EU legal order’, 48 CML Rev (2011) p. 1025 at p. 1028-1033.
17ECJ 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v Council and Commission, para. 285.
18ECJ 8 March 2011, Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system, para. 80.
19This is evident from the (now declassified) negotiation directives, Council document 10602/10.
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In this regard the Opinion is not devoid of a degree of irony, given that the
Court of Justice expressly points out the truism that the EU is precluded from
being considered a state under international law.20 While this would suggest that
in contrast to some states, which robustly defend the idea of their own sovereignty,
the Union would be more open to integration into an international human rights
mechanism, the Court has used this argument to achieve the exact opposite.
The Court of Justice identified seven distinct shortcomings of the Draft
Agreement, some of which consist of several subparts, which rendered the Draft
Agreement incompatible with the Treaties. They are analysed in detail in the
section below titled ‘Is Accession Still Possible?’ together with possible solutions
that the member states can adopt in order to address them. It will be demonstrated
that some of these shortcomings, such as the exact role of the European Court of
Human Rights in the co-respondent and prior involvement procedures as well as
the insufficient protection of Article 344 TFEU relate to details in the
arrangements already laid down in the Draft Agreement. Others, such as the
failure to adequately take account of Article 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, of the principle of mutual trust, of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, and of the dangers posed by Protocol No. 16 to the Convention deal with
issues outside the Draft Agreement, which, save for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy issue, the negotiators do not seem to have discussed. Ultimately,
these latter issues are more difficult to overcome.
Technical options and their limitations
There are a number of conceivable ways of effecting accession in the wake of the
Court’s opinion. In terms of intensity they range from amending the EU Treaties,
to amending the Draft Agreement, to unilateral declarations and internal
commitments on the part of the EU and its member states. Their respective merits
and drawbacks are briefly outlined in the abstract at this point. This provides a
background to the subsequent discussion of the Opinion and of the way forward.
Article 218(11) TFEU expressly mentions Treaty amendment as a possible
reaction to a non-favourable opinion. The member states could, for instance,
repeal Protocol No. 8, which would remove at least part of the legal basis for the
Court’s objections. There would, of course, be no guarantee that the Court would
not voice the same or very similar concerns based on the Treaties minus the
Protocol, so that this route would carry with it certain risks. A more radical but
equally more reliable option would be the adoption of a ‘notwithstanding’
Protocol, as advocated in the editorial of the last issue of this journal.21
20Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 156.
21Editorial, ‘A Constitutional Moment: Acceding to the ECHR (or not)’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 1.
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The Protocol would simply declare that the Union accedes to the Convention on the
basis of the Draft Agreement notwithstanding Opinion 2/13. The main drawback of
this solution is that it would need to comply with the requirements of the ordinary
revision procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU, the most important of which is the
achievement of unanimity among the member states. Politically this would
presuppose that the issue of EU accession is as high on the agenda of member
states as it is on that of European human rights lawyers and one can certainly doubt
that.22 Thus it makes sense to explore alternatives to Treaty change where possible.
The EU and its member states could adopt unilateral measures, such as
reservations under Article 57 of the Convention, declarations of interpretation,
disconnection declarations, and EU-internal agreements. As far as reservations are
concerned, Article 57 considerably restricts the room for effectively ensuring that the
Union’s constitutional requirements are complied with. The EU would be allowed
‘when acceding to this Convention [to] make a reservation in respect of any particular
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law of the European Union then
in force is not in conformity with the provision.’ Reservations ‘of a general character’
are not permitted.23 Hence reservations can only be made if four conditions are
fulfilled. First, a reservation would have to be made at the time of accession.
Subsequent reservations or amendments to existing reservations are not possible, so
that developments in the law of the EU could not be incorporated at a later stage.
Second, a reservation must not be general, i.e. it must not be ‘couched in terms that
are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and
scope.’24 Third, it must name the provision of Union law that is to be exempted from
compliance with the Convention; and that provision must be in force at the time of
ratification. Fourth, the reservation must name the provision of the Convention to
which it applies and contain a brief statement of the law concerned.25 The European
Court of Human Rights reviews compliance with Article 57 of the Convention and
can declare reservations invalid. It has made use of this possibility in the past.26
Furthermore, the Court of Human Rights has jurisdiction to interpret the meaning
of the reservation. This suggests that not only may reservations not achieve the desired
outcome, but that they are also exposed to the risk of the Court of Human Rights
finding them invalid or interpreting them in a way not intended by the drafters.
Declarations of interpretation are unilateral statements made by parties to a Treaty,
which clarify the meaning of a Treaty provision. Declarations of interpretationmay be
22See Council Document 7977/15, which summarises discussions on the way forward, with
Treaty change not among them.
23See Art. 2 DAA.
24ECtHR 29 April 1988, Case No. 10328/83, Belilos v Switzerland, para. 55.
25See also ECtHR 4March 2014, Case Nos. 18640/10; 18647/10; 18663/10; 18668/10; 18698/10,
Grande Stevens and Others v Italy, para. 207.
26E.g. in Belilos v Switzerland, n. 24 supra.
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useful to rectify deficits in the Draft Agreement, which are caused by inaccurate
formulations and insufficiently precise representations of EU law. The main drawback
of such declarations is that the European Court of Human Rights might consider
them as reservations and measure them by the requirements of Article 57 of the
Convention.27Moreover, they would only be binding on the Court of HumanRights
if they were recognised as authentic interpretations by the other parties to the Draft
Agreement.28 This leaves the EU and the member states exposed to the risk that the
European Court of Human Rights might not accept their interpretation.
Similar concerns can be raised against the use of disconnection declarations.29
Such declarations aim to preserve the autonomy of EU law in respect of
agreements concluded by both the EU and its member states by ‘disconnecting’
EU-internal relations from the overall agreement.30 Their wording tends to be
along these lines: ‘[T]he Member States of the [EU] which are party to the
Convention in their mutual relations apply the provisions of the Convention in
accordance with the [EU]’s internal rules and without prejudice to appropriate
amendments being made to these rules’.31 Again, this type of declaration cannot
guarantee that a case is not brought before the European Court of Human Rights
and would be considered admissible so that the Court of Justice may not consider
this as sufficient. For similar reasons the Court of Justice may not accept binding
EU-internal commitments by the member states and the institutions not to avail
themselves of certain options offered by the Draft Accession Agreement.
Given the deficiencies of each of these options, the most sensible option for a
number of the shortfalls identified by the Court would be for the EU and its
member states to make an attempt at renegotiating the Draft Agreement in order
to make it compliant with the requirements set out in Opinion 2/13.
Is accession still possible?
This section will show that many of the Court’s concerns are unconvincing.
Nonetheless Opinion 2/13 is a reality. In order to allow accession to still take place,
27As happened ibid.
28 I. Cameron, ‘Treaties, Declarations of Interpretation’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2008).
29Advocated e.g. by P. Jan Kuijper, ‘Reaction to Leonard Besselink’s ACELG Blog’ <acelg.
blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-besselinks’s-acelg-blog/>, visited 10 August 2015;
R. A. Wessel and A. Łazowski, ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the
European Union to the ECHR’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 179 at p. 197.
30On disconnection clauses in general see M. Cremona, ‘Disconnection Clauses in EU Law and
Practice’, in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart 2010).
31Cf. Unilateral declaration of the EU in respect of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (adopted 20 October 2005, entered into
force 18 March 2007) 2240 UNTS.
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the Court’s concerns need to be defined as precisely as possible so that bespoke
solutions can be proposed.32 It is possible to identify three themes pervading the
Opinion: a considerable extension of the autonomy of EU law; a distrust in the
workings of the EU legal order resulting in the externalisation of internally resolvable
issues; and a misconception of the technicalities of the Draft Agreement. Given that
in a number of instances the Court was tilting at windmills, some of the proposals
might seem redundant, but may nonetheless be necessary to pacify the Court.
The co-respondent mechanism: Procedure for the involvement of the co-respondent
The Court of Justice found fault with two aspects of the co-respondent
mechanism: the procedure for the involvement of the co-respondent and the
allocation of responsibility under Article 3(7) of the Draft Agreement.
The Draft Agreement foresaw two possibilities of involving a co-respondent:
either the European Court of Human Rights would invite the co-respondent to
join; or the co-respondent would request its involvement. In the latter case the
Court of Human Rights ‘shall assess whether, in light of the reasons given by the
[contracting party] concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in [Article 3(2) or
(3) of the Draft] are met.’33 Hence a decision on the plausibility of whether
‘it appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the
[Convention] rights at issue [...] of a provision of European Union law’ would be
required. The Court of Justice considered this to be liable to interfere with the
division of powers between the EU and its member states given that the Court of
Human Rights ‘would be required to assess the rules of EU law governing the
division of powers between the EU and the Member States as well as the criteria
for the attribution of their acts or omissions.’34
This strict reasoning by the Court exemplifies the extension of the autonomy
principle. The plausibility review was adopted as a deliberately superficial standard
of review designed to avoid a situation in which the European Court of Human
Rights would be forced to make a binding assessment on the division of powers
between the Union and the member states, which would potentially be contrary to
the autonomy of EU law.35 Moreover, the Draft Agreement refers to the ‘calling
32Note that the order in which they are presented here differs from the order in the Opinion.
33Art. 3(5) DAA.
34Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 224-225; a similar argument was made by AG Kokott: View of
AG Kokott delivered on 13 June 2014 in ECJ, 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, paras. 231-232.
35SeeDraft Explanatory Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (47 + 1(2013)
008rev2), para. 55.
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into question’ of a provision of EU law, which would suggest that the Court of
Human Rights would carry out its assessment on the basis of the application
before it and the reasons given by the prospective co-respondent and would not
conduct a final determination on the basis of the EU Treaties.
As far as the way forward is concerned, it is difficult to see how unilateral action,
e.g. an interpretative declaration, on the part of the EU and its member states,
could achieve the desired outcome given that the wording of the Draft Agreement
would suggest the exact opposite and that it would not be binding on the
European Court of Human Rights. Thus the most appropriate solution would be
to amend the Draft Agreement by removing the power of the Court of Human
Rights to review the plausibility of a co-respondent request. This amendment
could provide that the prospective co-respondent would have to be granted this
status without any review, i.e. purely at its request.
The co-respondent mechanism: allocation of responsibility under Article 3(7) of the
Draft Agreement
As already mentioned, the Draft Agreement provides that the respondent and
co-respondent would be jointly responsible if the European Court of Human Rights
finds a violation of the Convention. Article 3(7) of the Draft, however, stipulates an
exception by giving the Court of Human Rights jurisdiction to decide that ‘on the
basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, and having
sought the views of the applicant […] only one of them be held responsible’. It is clear
that the autonomy of EU law stands in the way of a provision that gives the Court of
Human Rights jurisdiction to make a final decision on the internal division of
responsibility between the EU and its member states as such a determination would
have to be made on the basis of the EU Treaties.36
A binding declaration on the part of the EU and its member states to never
request that the European Court of Human Rights allocate responsibility might
provide a solution to this problem. One can, however, harbour doubts as to
whether the Court of Justice would accept this as sufficient. Throughout the
Opinion it has become obvious that the Court of Justice does not trust the
workings of its own legal order, e.g. with regard to Protocol No. 16 or Article 344
TFEU.37 It is not likely that it would accept an internally binding measure when
the Court of Human Rights would still have jurisdiction to allocate responsibility
under Article 3(7) of the Draft Agreement.
Hence an amendment of the Draft would be the safer option. One could
simply remove the critical half sentence at the end of Article 3(7) of the Draft and
36Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 229-235; View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 175-179.
37See infra.
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thereby deprive the Court of Human Rights of its right to allocate responsibility in
the circumstances set out therein. Halberstam seems to propose a different
solution by suggesting that the Human Rights Court should be deprived of the
power to second-guess the EU’s view on joint and sole responsibility.38 This would
presumably mean that the Draft Agreement would be amended in such a way that
the respondent and the co-respondent could inform the Court of Human Rights
that the responsibility for the violation should be given to only one of them.
Although this solution would certainly accord with the requirements of the
autonomy of EU law, it would be contrary to the Convention system as a whole.
After all, the applicant has brought a case against the respondent, which was then
joined by the co-respondent, but could then be deprived of either the respondent
or the co-respondent. The whole point of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
of Human Rights seems to be that a respondent (and a co-respondent after they
have agreed to join) cannot escape responsibility without the agreement of the
applicant. A workable compromise between these two positions could consist of
requiring the applicant to give permission to a request by the respondent and
co-respondent that responsibility should be allocated to only one of them. It
would have to make clear that the Court of Human Rights does not have
jurisdiction to question this request.
The Court and the Advocate General identified the further problem that Article
3(7) of the Draft does not account for situations in which member states have
made a reservation. In their view it could thus happen that a member state is held
responsible despite a reservation. This they consider at odds with Article 2 of
Protocol No. 8, which provides that accession must not affect ‘the situation of
Member States in relation to the European Convention.’39 In order to be able to
propose a solution, it is necessary to briefly outline in which situations the problem
of reservations can materialise. Where a member state authority has acted, the
alleged violation would be attributed to the member state under Article 1(4) of
the Draft Agreement. If the member state had made a reservation in respect of the
alleged violation, it cannot be a respondent and its position is not compromised.
Hence the issue of reservations only materialises where the member state acts as a
co-respondent, i.e. in a situation where the EU is respondent. The member state
may decide to join the Union as co-respondent. If the Court were to find a
violation of the European Convention, then, according to the Court, the member
state would be jointly responsible for the violation despite its reservation. Given
that the co-respondent status is voluntary, this is likely to be a very rare problem.
38D. Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’, 16German Law Journal (2015) p. 105 at
p. 137.
39Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 226-228; View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, para. 265.
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Realistically it could only materialise if the proceedings are not limited to
violations in respect of which the member state has made its reservation40 so that it
may have an interest in being involved regardless.
Admittedly, the Draft Agreement is silent as to the effect of reservations on the
co-respondent. But instead of assuming that the member state would be
responsible despite its reservation, it would have been more convincing to hold
that where the Draft Agreement is silent, the standard rules of the European
Convention would be applied, which means that the reservation would be given
effect.41 Moreover, the question remains whether in light of the voluntariness of
the mechanism one can truly say that the Draft Agreement itself affects the
situation of the member states with regard to the Convention.
One option for resolving this would be an interpretative declaration to the effect
that reservations made by the member states of the EU must be respected. Yet again
the Court of Justice might not consider this sufficient, as the Court of Human Rights
might still find a responsibility as co-respondent unless theDraft Agreement expressly
excluded this scenario. Hence the safest solution would be a clarifying sentence in the
Draft Agreement stating that a member state cannot be held responsible either as
respondent or as co-respondent in so far as it has made a reservation.
The prior involvement mechanism
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court of Justice considered that the very mechanism it
had demanded be included was incompatible with the Treaties.42 Having
confirmed that the introduction of a prior involvement procedure was
constitutionally required, the Court of Justice held that the solution found in
the Draft Agreement was insufficient. First, it considered that it was not for the
Court of Human Rights to decide whether a prior involvement should take place,
but for the competent EU institution;43 and second, it found that the prior
involvement procedure was unduly restrictive by allowing the involvement only to
take place where the compatibility, viz. validity, of a provision of EU law was at
issue and not where mere questions of interpretation of EU law arose.44
40On reservations under Art. 57 ECHR see supra.
41Art. 57 ECHR; Art. (1)(d) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
42See Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of
the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010; Joint communication from the Presidents of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, further to the
meeting between the two courts in January 2011, both available at <www.curia.europa.eu>,
visisted 10 August 2015.
43Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 238.
44Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 242-247.
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Concerning the first point, the Court of Justice’s key argument is that the Draft
Agreement would confer jurisdiction on the Court of Human Rights to interpret
the case law of the Court of Justice.45 This is not convincing. It is important to
recall the wording of Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement concerning the prior
involvement: all the Court of Human Rights is asked to do is to give the Court of
Justice sufficient time to make an assessment as to whether the provision of EU
law concerned is compatible with human rights. This is preceded by the condition
that the Court of Justice must not yet have done so. On the basis of the wording of
the provision, there is not much to suggest that the Court of Human Rights would
carry out an interpretation of the case law of the Court of Justice. It would rather
be a superficial glance at the domestic proceedings, and in a case where a reference
request had been made, whether the Court of Justice’s answer engaged with the
fundamental rights question before the Court of Human Rights. In this sense the
Court of Human Rights’ ‘review’ would at most resemble an examination as to
whether an applicant has exhausted domestic remedies. Admittedly, the wording
of Article 3(6) Draft Agreement could be construed in a broader manner so that
the Court of Human Rights would be required to assess whether the Court of
Justice has ever considered the compatibility of the provision of EU law at issue,
i.e. including in proceedings unconnected to those before the Court of Human
Rights. But this would first require an interpretational stretch, as Article 3(6) Draft
Agreement expressly refers to ‘proceedings to which the [EU] is a co-respondent’,
which suggests that the proceedings in which the assessment must have taken
place are the very proceedings pending before the Court of Human Rights. And
second, one should bear in mind that the consequence of such an assessment by
the Court of Human Rights is purely procedural: it must afford sufficient time to
the Court of Justice to make such an assessment. This confirms that the prior
involvement procedure is entirely a procedure under EU law, which the Court of
Human Rights must allow to happen. The Court of Justice has thus revealed a
blind spot for the practicalities of the procedure before the Court of Human
Rights and reinforced its broad notion of autonomy including non-binding
assessments of EU law by another court.
The argument concerning the second point rests on the premise that the prior
involvement is necessary in order to ensure the autonomy of the EU legal order.
The Court feared that after accession, the Court of Human Rights may be asked to
interpret EU law and would be in a position to choose between different plausible
interpretations.46 This argument is not conclusive, as it seems to misunderstand
the way in which such cases would reach the Court of Human Rights. The Court
of Human Rights would be seised only after a case had been decided by a domestic
45 Ibid, para. 239.
46 Ibid, paras. 245-246.
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court, which may have interpreted EU law if that was necessary for its decision.
The alleged violation would consist of the domestic court’s decision, i.e. the
interpretation of EU law adopted by it. The Court of Human Rights would accept
this interpretation as part of the facts of the case, on which it would base its
assessment. Hence, the question is whether there can be a situation in which
no reference has been made in a case that would later involve the EU as a
co-respondent but which would nonetheless raise a mere question of
interpretation without calling into question the compatibility of the provision
with the Convention. This is difficult to imagine.
Nonetheless, the Opinion demands a reaction on the part of the EU and its
member states. It would first have to be made clear that the decision to involve the
Court of Justice is entirely one for the EU to take. Again, a mere interpretative
declaration or other unilateral action might not satisfy the Court of Justice.
Instead, an amendment of the Draft Agreement with a rule to the effect that the
Court of Human Rights ‘must suspend proceedings if the EU as a co-respondent
informs it that the Court of Justice would be involved’, might suffice. Moreover,
the term ‘compatibility’ would have to be either re-defined as including
interpretations or would have to be replaced by a sentence to the effect that in
cases where the Court of Justice has not yet interpreted the EU law at issue, a prior
involvement could take place. The suggested amendment might resolve this
automatically, given that it would be entirely up to the competent EU institution,
presumably the EU Commission, to decide whether a prior involvement should
take place so that the Court of Human Rights would never be in a situation of
having to decide about the admissibility of a prior involvement. In this case an
additional clarifying unilateral declaration to the effect that ‘conformity’ is to be
understood to include ‘interpretation’ might be sufficient.
The Court of Justice demanded in the subsequent paragraph that the ‘prior
involvement procedure should be set up in such as way as to ensure that, in any
case pending before the Court of Human Rights, the EU is fully […] informed’ so
that the competent institution can decide whether a prior involvement should be
initiated. This ignores the fact that the prior involvement question only arises
where the EU has already decided to become co-respondent so that the Union
would certainly be aware of these proceedings and could initiate the prior
involvement where needed. The Court of Justice seems to have misunderstood the
procedure before the Court of Human Rights in this regard. It would have been
more convincing if the Court had taken on board the Advocate General’s concerns
regarding the rights of defence in respect of the co-respondent mechanism.47
Protocol No. 8 expressly requires that arrangements be made that ‘individual
applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as
47View of A-G Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 222-228.
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appropriate.’ This presupposes that potential co-respondents are informed if
applications with an EU law dimension are pending before the Court of Human
Rights. Otherwise potential co-respondents may never find out about these cases,
as reliance on the Court of Human Rights taking the initiative and spelling out an
invitation cannot be considered sufficient. She therefore demanded the Draft
Agreement should contain a requirement that a full and systematic information of
a potential co-respondent occurs.
In reaction to this, the Draft Agreement would need to be amended with a
provision obliging the Court of Human Rights to ‘ensure that in any case pending
before it the EU is fully and systematically informed so that the competent EU
institution is able to assess whether a prior involvement is necessary’. In light of the
Advocate General’s more convincing criticism, it would make sense to extend this
duty to inform the EU to all cases in which the EU could potentially be a
co-respondent. Of course, this could not be easily achieved in practice given the
sheer number of applications against EU member states that reach the Court of
Human Rights every day, not all of which are likely to specify that there may be a
connection between EU law and the violation. One option would be for the Court
of Human Rights to communicate all cases brought against EUmember states also
to the EU, but this might be considered inappropriate given that the vast number
of cases brought before the Court of Human Rights probably have nothing to do
with EU law. A better solution would be to oblige the member states to ensure that
all potential co-respondent cases are brought to the attention of the EU as soon as
they have been communicated. This already flows from the duty of loyal
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, but could be reiterated in the Draft
Agreement itself to satisfy the Court.
The Court of Justice’s exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 TFEU
The Court of Justice further held that the accession agreement only insufficiently
protected its exclusive jurisdiction over inter-party disputes between member
states and between the Union and member states. This exclusive jurisdiction flows
from the autonomy of the EU legal order and is confirmed by Article 344
TFEU.48 It provides that ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of
settlement other than those provided for therein’. The Court rightly considered
that after accession the Convention, like any other Union agreement, would
become an integral part of EU law as far as it came within the scope of EU law so
48See to this effect ECJ 14 December 1991, Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement relating to the
creation of the European Economic Area, para. 35; Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 201; Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, supra n. 17, para. 282; Art. 3 of
Protocol No. 8 expressly protects Art. 344 TFEU.
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that the Court of Justice would acquire jurisdiction to interpret it.49 Cases
between member states could be brought before it under Article 259 TFEU.50
Article 55 of the Convention equally provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Human Rights over inter-party disputes. The drafters of the Draft
Agreement realised that in case of accession, there could be a conflict of
jurisdiction and therefore added Article 5 of the Draft, which states that
proceedings before the Court of Justice ‘shall [not] be understood as constituting
[a] means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Article 55 of the
Convention’. By thus removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Human
Rights over such cases, the drafters aimed to avoid a conflict between the two
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Member states would be able to bring their disputes
over the Convention before the Court of Justice without infringing the (hitherto)
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights, but if they chose to bring
them before that Court, they would be in violation of Article 344 TFEU.
The Court of Justice did not share this conclusion and confirmed its lack of
trust in the EU’s own legal order, which shows again how the Court has ratcheted
up the requirements for compliance with the autonomy of EU law. It ignored the
Advocate General, who had pointed out that the tools available under EU law to
prevent or pursue a violation of Article 344 TFEU, such as infringement
proceedings or interim measures, were adequate.51 It held instead that the mere
possibility of an inter-party dispute between two member states or between
the Union undermines Article 344 TFEU.52 Hence the Court demanded that the
jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights be expressly excluded in relation to
the application of the Convention within the scope of EU law.
The Court of Justice’s view was defended by Halberstam, who pointed out that
the Court added that ‘if the EU or Member States did in fact have to bring a dispute
between them before the ECtHR, the latter would, pursuant to Article 33 ECHR
find itself seised of such a dispute.’53 Halberstam contends that the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights in such a case would be a problem and
that the Court of Justice could not be asked ‘to approve of an agreement extending
the reach of a provision that, under certain factual circumstances mandates a violation
of EU law.’54 This defence of the Court of Justice is unconvincing. It merely mirrors
the hyperbolic character of the Court of Justice’s reaction to the accession agreement,
which essentially finds fault with the agreement because it opens up an opportunity
for the member states to breach the Treaties.
49ECJ 30 April 1974, Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium; Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 204.
50Haegeman v Belgium, n. 49 supra.
51View of A-G Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 114-119.
52Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 208.
53Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 209.
54Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120.
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What this part of the Opinion mainly demonstrates is how the Court has raised
the requirements for compliance with the autonomy of EU law. In particular its
reliance on the Mox Plant case, in which Ireland had been found in breach of
Article 344 TFEU, is problematic.55 As Johansen correctly argues, the agreement
in that case equally provided for the jurisdiction of an international court over a
mixed agreement.56 In stark contrast to Opinion 2/13, the Court inMox deemed
it sufficient that the agreement contained the possibility that such a conflict be
avoided by giving the international court a means to divest itself of the dispute.57
This stance again reveals the Court of Justice’s lack of trust in the EU’s own legal
order. The consequence of this is that the EU is becoming an even more awkward
partner on the international plane. Requiring the protection of the autonomy of
EU law in a watertight manner requires an externalisation of internally resolvable
issues, which is new and worrying because it makes the EU a difficult partner to
deal with.
The solution to this is not as straightforward as it may seem given that one must
find a formulation that does not violate the autonomy of the EU legal order. The
Opinion shows that an internal solution would not satisfy the Court of Justice.
After all, such a solution already exists in the guise of Article 344 TFEU and was
deemed insufficient. This suggests that any other exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Human Rights agreed between the Union and the member states
only would not be deemed sufficient either.
Hence the most obvious way forward would be an amendment of the Draft
Agreement. As will be shown this may necessitate a broader exclusion of disputes
as actually demanded by the Court, which insisted on an express exclusion of the
Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction ‘over disputes between Member States or
between Member States and the EU in relation to the application of the
Convention within the scope ratione materiae of EU law.’58 If the Draft Accession
Agreement were amended to include a clause reflecting this quote, the Court of
Human Rights would be required to decide in a hypothetical case between two
member states whether the Convention was applicable as an integral part of EU
law or not. This, however, would be contrary to the autonomy of EU law and it
might thus be necessary to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights
over all disputes between member states and between member states and the EU
55ECJ 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland.
56S. Ø. Johansen, ‘The Reinterpretation of TFEU Art. 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential
Consequences’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 169 at p. 172-176. Hence a solution would have
to prevent such
57See Art. 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3; see Commission v Ireland n. 55 supra,
para. 125.
58 Ibid., para. 213.
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in a blanket manner.59 This would also result in the exclusion of disputes that have
nothing to do with EU law. A possibility of avoiding this might be the
introduction of a pre-clearing mechanism similar to the prior involvement
procedure, which might allow the Court of Justice to make this assessment before
the Court of Human Rights continues its proceedings. Yet such a pre-clearing
mechanism would complicate such proceedings considerably and might fall at the
same hurdles as the prior involvement mechanism.
Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
A further concern addressed by the Court, but not the Advocate General, is the
compatibility of the Draft Agreement with Article 53 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which provides:
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by
Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or
all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection
ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by theMember States’ constitutions.
In theMelloni decision, the Court of Justice had decided that this provision could not
be interpreted in a way that would undermine the ‘primacy, unity and effectiveness of
EU law’.60 As the Charter binds the member states only when they are acting within
the scope of EU law61 this means that they are only allowed to apply a higher
standard of protection than required by the Charter if this is compatible with their
EU law obligations, which continue to enjoy primacy over both national
constitutional law and over international law. In Opinion 2/13 the Court
suggested that there could be a conflict between this reading of Article 53 of the
Charter and Article 53 of the Convention, which allows parties to the Convention to
lay down higher standards of human rights protection than what is strictly required
by it. The Court considered this to potentially empower the member states to
circumvent the limitations resulting from the primacy of EU law. It therefore
required that there be coordination between the two Articles 53.62
This is not convincing and demonstrates again that the Court of Justice has no
confidence in the workings of the EU legal order. From the point of view of EU law
59This is suggested by Johansen, supra n. 56, p. 178.
60ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, para. 60,
confirming inter alia ECJ 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel.
61ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 19-22.
62Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 189.
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the legal situation in this respect would not change with accession. Member states
would still be bound to comply with the primacy of EU law. The fact that the
Convention, and thus its Article 53, would have to be considered an integral part of
EU law would not make a difference for two reasons. First, international treaties
concluded by the EUmust still comply with EU primary law so that Article 53 of the
Charter as interpreted by the Court of Justice would prevail in case of conflict.63
Second, Article 53 of the Convention merely provides that the Convention cannot be
construed as limiting other fundamental rights contained in domestic legal orders. But
this does not mean that it places parties to the Convention under an obligation to
apply higher standards than what is strictly required by the Convention. As
Halberstam has pointed out, Article 53 of the Convention cannot create a power that
did not previously exist.64 There is no potential for conflict, so the problem identified
by the Court of Justice does not exist. Article 53 of the Convention already enables
member states to apply higher standards than those strictly required by the
Convention. Moreover, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that rights in the
Charter corresponding to those in the Convention shall have the same meaning and
scope. This includes the case law of the Court of Human Rights.65 It is therefore
inconceivable that the Convention would provide a higher standard than the Charter.
As with Article 344 TFEU, this is an issue for which EU law as it currently stands
provides an internally binding solution. An interpretative declaration by the EU to
the effect that ‘the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law would be unaffected’
by accessionmight thus not satisfy the Court as it would not guarantee that the Court
of Human Rights would respect this. Hence the safest option would be to add a
clarifying provision into the Draft Agreement. The drafters would again need to be
conscious of not accidentally allowing the Court of Human Rights to interpret EU
law, and in particular Article 53 of the Charter. A possible solution could be a clause
along these lines: ‘Article 53 of the Convention shall not be interpreted as requiring
the EU’s Member States to provide a higher domestic standard of human rights
protection than that provided for by the Convention’.
Mutual trust and mutual recognition
The Court raised a more fundamental issue with regard to the principle of mutual
trust, on which the principle of mutual recognition, primarily of relevance in the
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, is predicated. Mutual trust is the basis on
63 In hierarchical terms international agreements concluded by the EU are on a mezzanine level
between primary and secondary law. Their prevalence over secondary law results from Art. 216(2)
TFEU and their need to comply with primary law is presupposed by Art. 218(11) TFEU.
64Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120.
65See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, which
according to Art. 52(7) CFR must be given ‘due regard’.
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which a member state may be allowed to presume that fundamental rights have
been observed by other member states. This prevents, for instance, a member state
that has been requested to execute a European Arrest Warrant from subjecting this
request to fundamental rights scrutiny. It can neither review the fundamental
rights compliance on the basis of its own constitutional guarantees nor on the basis
of the rights guaranteed by EU law.66 Instead, member states recognise each
other’s human rights standards. The Court considered the Draft Agreement to
endanger this very concept by opening up the possibility of requiring one
‘Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental
rights’ as this would upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the
autonomy of EU law.67 According to the Court of Justice, the key flaw of the
Draft Agreement in this respect was that it treated the EU like a state by giving it a
role identical to that of every other contracting party, which disregarded its
intrinsic nature.68
It is necessary to deconstruct the Court’s argument in order to fully appreciate
its significance. First, the Court considers mutual trust to be a foundational value
of the EU. It locates it in Article 2 TEU, which names the common values on
which the Union is founded. Given that all member states share these values, the
Court considers that this implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust.69 This
way the Court elevated the principle of mutual trust to the status of a core
constitutional concept and equated it with direct effect and primacy, which are
concepts long held to characterise the supranational nature of the EU legal order.70
Although they are not expressly laid down in the Treaties, they operate across the
Treaties and are thus truly foundational. By contrast, mutual trust as the basis for
mutual recognition is relevant in free movement law71 and in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. In particular in the latter, mutual recognition is
mentioned in a number of Treaty articles, but mainly as an instruction to the
legislator that it ought to be the basis for legislation in this area. One can thus
question the doctrinal soundness of the Court’s argument.
Second, the Court additionally considered that by treating the EU like a state
and ignoring its intrinsic nature, the Draft Agreement failed to appreciate that the
member states have accepted that the relations between them ‘are governed by EU
law to the exclusion […] of any other law’. It thereby tried to seal off the relations
between member states against any review by the Court of Human Rights.
66Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 192.
67 Ibid, para. 194.
68 Ibid, para. 193.
69 Ibid, para. 168.
70See e.g. the Court’s reliance on only these two concepts in Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, para. 65.
71ECJ 20 February 1979, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für
Branntwein.
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With the traditional autonomy principle in mind, this is not surprising as far as the
right to interpret the rules governing the relations between the member states is
concerned. However, it is remarkable that this should exclude a review of the
human rights compatibility of this set-up.
The Court’s strict stance suggests deep concerns about the Court of Human
Rights’ case law touching on mutual recognition in general, and the Dublin
system on asylum in particular. Under the Dublin Regulation, an asylum request
is processed by the member state through which the asylum seeker entered the
EU.72 If an application for asylum is made in another member state, the asylum
seeker is usually sent back to the state of entry. The Court of Human Rights’ basic
doctrinal framework for extradition cases was developed in Soering and Chahal.73
An extradition must be stopped where the victim is facing a ‘real risk’ of having his
human rights violated in the receiving state. These cases are often concerned with
Article 3 of the Convention,74 but may also concern other violations, such as
flagrant denials of justice contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.75 It is recalled
that inM.S.S. the Court of Human Rights held that an EU member state violates
Article 3 of the Convention if, on the basis of mutual recognition, it sends an
asylum seeker back to a member state where that person would face a real risk of
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country.76 The
respondent member state was thus forced to process the asylum application by
making use of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, which constitutes an
exception to the general rule that the first member state entered by the asylum
seeker is responsible for processing that person’s asylum application. This was
accepted by the Court of Justice in N.S.77 However, in a later case the Court of
Justice held that situations such as in M.S.S. where there were ‘systemic
deficiencies in the asylum procedure’ were the only ones in which the obligation to
use Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation existed.78 This was a clear attempt to
confine the fallout of the M.S.S. decision to extreme cases. In Tarakhel v
Switzerland, however, the Court of Human Rights made it obvious that it
disagreed with this strict reading of M.S.S. and held that even though there had
72See Arts. 3 and 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 [2003] OJ L
50/1.
73ECtHR 7 July 1989, Case No. 14038/88, Soering v United Kingdom; ECtHR 15 November
1996, Case No. 22414/93, Chahal v United Kingdom; recently confirmed in ECtHR 28 February
2009, Case No. 37201/06, Saadi v Italy.
74E.g. Chahal v United Kingdom, supra n. 73.
75E.g. ECtHR 17 January 2012, Case No. 8139/09, Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.
76ECtHR 21 January 2011, Case No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, paras. 341-369.
77ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,N.S. v Secretary of State for the
Home Department.
78ECJ 10 December 2013, Case C-394/12, Shamso Abdullahli v Bundesasylamt, para. 60.
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not been a systemic breakdown of the asylum procedure in this case, the Swiss
authorities, who wanted to send the applicant back to Italy, were under an
obligation to take into account the applicant’s individual situation and, if
necessary, to obtain assurances from Italy that the conditions for the applicant
would be compliant with Article 3 of the Convention.79
This example highlights the potential of accession to undermine mutual
recognition in EU law. So far the Dublin system seems to be the only area where
this has materialised, but there are no guarantees that this would continue to be
the case after accession. For instance, currently mutual recognition in Brussels
Regulation cases, such as cases concerned with child abduction,80 escapes the
Court of Human Rights’ scrutiny as it benefits from the Bosphorus presumption.81
After accession, however, it could well be the case that the Court of Human Rights
would give up the Bosphorus presumption and intervene more strongly. As far as
the European Arrest Warrant is concerned, the Court of Human Rights has not
yet interfered with the principle of mutual recognition, but applications such as
Stapleton v Ireland, which was declared manifestly ill-founded, suggest a general
willingness on the part of the Court of Human Rights to subject the execution of
an European Arrest Warrant to human rights review.82 This is best demonstrated
by the Court of Human Rights’ remark in Ignaoua that ‘the mutual trust and
confidence underpinning measures of police and judicial cooperation among EU
member States must be accorded some weight’, which falls remarkably short of
according it immunity from review.83
In order to find a viable solution to protect the principle of mutual recognition
it is worth recalling the Court’s very words:
In so far as the ECHR would […] require a Member State to check that
another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes
an obligation of mutual trust between thoseMember States, accession is liable to upset
the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.
However, the agreement envisaged contains no provision to prevent such a
development.84
79ECtHR 4 November 2014, Case No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v Switzerland, paras. 114-120.
Switzerland is of course not a member state of the EU, but partakes in the Dublin system and was
thus treated by the ECtHR as if it were a member state, ibid., para. 88.
80Laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the
matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1.
81E.g. in ECtHR 18 June 2013, Case No. 3890/11, Povse v Austria; on the presumption cf. infra.
82ECtHR 4 May 2010, Case No. 56588/07, Stapleton v Ireland.
83ECtHR 18 March 2014, Case No. 46706/08, Ignaoua and Others v United Kingdom.
84Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 194-195.
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Hence a solution would have to prevent such cases from being adjudicated in
Strasbourg. Reservations would not be a viable possibility85 as they would have to
be made in respect of many Convention rights and name a large amount of EU
legislation, which might easily make them too general to be acceptable. Moreover,
they cannot be updated, which would be necessary where such a fast-developing
area as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is concerned.86
It would therefore be best to include a provision in the Draft Agreement itself.
As the Opinion highlights, even the slightest hint of giving the Court of Human
Rights the power to interpret EU law is likely to fall foul of the autonomy
principle. A formulation mirroring the above wording of the Opinion might best
reflect the Court’s demands and could be phrased like this: ‘AMember State of the
EU cannot be requested to check that another MS has observed fundamental
rights where EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust.’However, this would
prompt an investigation by the Court of Human Rights whether an obligation of
mutual trust existed or not and is thus not an option. The same would be true for
any draft referring to ‘a Member State’s obligations in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice’ or ‘where Member States act within the scope of EU law’,
and so on. Hence one needs to apply a broader brush in order to achieve the
desired result.
A safer option might be this: ‘Member States of the EU cannot be held
responsible under the Convention for failing to carry out a review of another
Member State’s compliance with Convention rights’. Crucially the Court of
Human Rights would not be required to interpret EU law. All it would need to do
is verify whether the case deals with two member states, which even the Court of
Justice is unlikely to consider a violation of the autonomy of EU law. The
drawback of this option is, of course, that it would also cover non-EU related cases,
e.g. judicial cooperation based on bilateral treaties.
Protocol No 16
The Court further criticised that the Draft Agreement did not make provision to
ensure that Protocol No. 16 to the Convention could not interfere with the
autonomy of the EU legal order and the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling
procedure.87 Protocol No. 16 allows the highest courts of the parties that have
signed up to it to request an advisory opinion from the Court of Human Rights on
85They are suggested by C. Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path
to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 147 at p. 164-165.
86Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 135 argues that the issue would resolve itself once changes to the
co-respondent mechanism have been made. However, this author does not agree with Halberstam’s
suggestions concerning Art. 3(7) DAA so that an automatic resolution is not convincing, see supra.
87Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 197.
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‘questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application’ of the
Convention.88 When Opinion 2/13 was handed down on 18 December 2014,
not a single member state had ratified the Protocol and only nine had signed it.89
The Protocol had not entered into force. The Draft Agreement does not foresee the
accession of the EU to the Protocol. In fact, it predates the Protocol.
The Court identified two potential issues with Protocol No. 16, neither of
which can convince in its entirety. First, the Court feared a circumvention of the
preliminary reference procedure if national courts of last instance that were seised
with a dispute concerning the compatibility of EU-related member state action
with fundamental rights asked the Court of Human Rights for an advisory
opinion instead of referring the case to the Court of Justice. Without expressly
saying so, the Court seemed to fear that if the Court of Human Rights were to
respond that there was a violation of the Convention in such a scenario, the
national court would no longer request a reference from the Court of Justice to
confirm this and (possibly) declare EU law invalid. Rather surprisingly, the Court
failed to appreciate two important facts: the advisory opinion would not be
binding on the national court;90 and under EU law, the national court would
undoubtedly remain under a duty to refer the case to the Court of Justice.
The Court did not expressly spell out a potentially more serious concern, which is
that after accession, the Convention would become an integral part of EU law as far
as member states were acting within its scope.91 Thus from the point of view of EU
law, a request for an advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 could be regarded as a
request to interpret EU law, which would potentially fall foul of the autonomy of EU
law.92 As pointed out above, up until Opinion 2/13 the autonomy of the EU legal
order had only been held to be infringed where another court was given jurisdiction
to make a binding interpretation of EU law, which would not be the case with
Protocol No. 16. This has clearly changed with Opinion 2/13.
Second, the Court saw a danger that the advisory opinion procedure could
trigger the prior involvement of the Court of Justice and thus lead to a
circumvention of the ‘proper’ route for involving it, which is Article 267 TFEU.
This concern is, however, further evidence for the misunderstanding of the prior
involvement on the part of the Court. Even a superficial reading of Article 3(6) of
88Art. 1 of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms – Explanatory Report <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf>, visited 10
August 2015; on the exact workings of the Protocol see K. Dzehtsiarou and N. O’Meara, ‘Advisory
Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: a magic bullet for dialogue and docket-control?’,
34 Legal Studies (2014) p. 444.
89Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
90Art. 5 of Protocol No. 16.
91See supra.
92To this effect see Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120-123.
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the Draft Agreement shows that the prior involvement is only supposed to be
possible where the EU is a co-respondent. The co-respondent mechanism is
designed for contentious cases. This is made clear by the wording of Article 3(2)
and (3) of the Draft, which expressly state that the application must be directed
against either a member state or the EU. In case of an advisory opinion, there is no
respondent. It is a procedure between the national court and the Court of Human
Rights, which does not decide the case but gives an opinion on the interpretation
or application of a specific provision of the Convention. Moreover, the advisory
opinion procedure is only open where fundamental questions are at stake,
i.e. questions hitherto not decided by the Court of Human Rights. Even if a
safeguard were built into the accession agreement, these questions would be likely
to end up in Strasbourg anyway.
Requiring an unspecified safeguard against Protocol No. 16 to be included in
the Draft Agreement thus seems to be an overreaction on the part of the Court of
Justice. Even if one accepted the Court’s concerns as valid, it could have confined
itself to making it clear that it did not think that after accession a member state
could be party to Protocol No. 16. Thus member states would have been under an
obligation to refrain from ratifying it. As no member state had done so, this would
not have been problematic to achieve in practice. This suggests that, in parallel to
the situation regarding Article 344 TFEU, the Court’s concerns would not be
allayed by a unilateral commitment on the part of the member states not to sign up
to Protocol No. 16. The safe option would thus be to amend the Draft Agreement.
One possibility would be to include a provision in the Draft Agreement that
member state courts did not have the right to request an advisory opinion in cases
in which they are interpreting or applying EU law, i.e. cases in which they would
be entitled or indeed required to request a preliminary reference.93 However, such
a solution might get caught in the autonomy trap, as the Court of Human Rights
would then be empowered to review whether in any given request by a member
state court this condition is satisfied, which would of course require an
interpretation of EU law. Thus the safe solution would be an express and
binding undertaking by the EU’s member states not to sign up or to Protocol No.
16 and for those that have already done so not to ratify the Protocol. This should,
in theory, assuage the Court’s concerns.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy
The final objection concerned the fact that after accession, the Court of Human
Rights would be able to review Common Foreign and Security Policy measures as
93NB: reservations to the provisions of Protocol No. 16 are not permissible, cf. Art. 9 of the
Protocol.
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to their compatibility with the Convention, whereas the Court of Justice’s
jurisdiction over the Common Foreign and Security Policy would remain limited.
Its jurisdiction concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy measures is
generally excluded save for the review of restrictive measures and for policing the
boundaries between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and all other
Union competences under Article 40 TEU.94 While most measures that could
raise human rights concerns can probably be classified as restrictive measures, such
as sanctions against individuals, there may be situations in which the Court’s
jurisdiction may be asymmetrical to that of the Court of Human Rights.95
The Court proceeded in two short steps. Having established that situations
were conceivable in which it had no jurisdiction but which would nonetheless be
reviewable by the Court of Human Rights,96 it held that this ‘would effectively
entrust the judicial review of those acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU
exclusively to a non-EU body’.97 This would contradict what it had held in
Opinion 1/09.98
This reasoning is unconvincing for two reasons. The first relates to the type of
review carried out by the Court of Human Rights. As demonstrated in the above
quote, the Court of Justice equated the judicial review that would be carried out by
the Court of Human Rights in case of accession with the review that it would have
to carry out if it had jurisdiction over Common Foreign and Security Policy
measures. Admittedly, the Court added the caveat that ‘any such review would be
limited to compliance with the rights guaranteed by the ECHR’, but did not
consider this to be material.99 This is a relevant difference, however: the Court of
Human Rights’ review is not based on EU law, but on the Convention. The fact
that the Convention would become an integral part of EU law cannot make a
difference in this respect, given that external accountability is the very point of the
Convention so that Article 6(2) TEU, which explicitly provides for accession,
must be seen as authorising such review to take place.100 As the Advocate General
convincingly argued, there is no conflict with the autonomy of the EU legal order
here because the unique supranational structure of Union law would not be
94Cf. Art. 275 TFEU.
95This term was coined by J-P. Jacqué, ‘The accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 48 CML Rev (2011) p. 995 at p. 1005;
for examples cf. T. Lock, ‘End of an epic? The draft accession agreement on the EU’s accession to the
ECHR’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 162 at p. 188-190.
96Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 252.
97 Ibid, para. 255.
98Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, para. 18.
99Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 255.
100This consideration also refutes the argument made by Halberstam that the function of the ECJ
as a harmonising voice would be undermined as the member states clearly did not want the Court to
have this role, cf. Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 137-144.
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affected by the Court of Human Rights’ review.101 It is hard to disagree with her
conclusion that the ‘absence of sufficient arrangements within the EU, by which the
autonomy of EU law alone can be protected, can hardly be seen as an argument
against recognition of the jurisdiction of the judicial body of an international
organisation.’102 Moreover, the Court of Justice conveniently ignores the fact that
EU accession would give the Court of Human Rights jurisdiction to review the
compatibility of EU primary law with the Convention. Hence the Common Foreign
and Security Policy would not be the only area over which the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights is asymmetrical.
The second reason relates to the neglect of the potential role of national courts
in these cases. The Lisbon Treaty places member states under an express duty to
‘provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law’.103 This confirms their position as ‘ordinary courts’ of the
European legal order.104 As convincingly argued by Hillion, they can therefore
‘step in if and when the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is restricted or non-
existent’.105 As the Common Foreign and Security Policy is a field covered by
Union law, the member state courts can therefore be deemed to have jurisdiction
even in the absence of the Court’s jurisdiction.106 The fact that the Court of
Justice is not competent to answer requests for a preliminary ruling in such
situations therefore does not deprive individuals of remedies in the EU legal order.
Thus the Court of Justice’s conclusion that the Draft Agreement would entrust the
review of EU acts exclusively to an international court is not convincing. It is not
without irony that in order to support this argument, the Court of Justice points
to Opinion 1/09, where it had expressly held that the EU’s judicial structure is not
only based on the Court of Justice but also on the courts of the member states.107
The main weakness in the Court’s argument stems from its neglect of
Article 6(2) TEU. In contrast to other provisions conferring external competence
on the EU, this one specifically relates to the Convention, which suggests that the
member states, when including it in the Lisbon Treaty, had the basic features of
the Convention system in mind and nonetheless wanted the Union to join.
Of course, Article 6(2) TEU cannot be read as authorising accession under all
101View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, para. 192.
102 Ibid., para. 193 (emphasis in the original).
103Art. 19(1) TEU.
104Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, in particular at para. 80.
105C. Hillion, ‘A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and
Security Policy’, in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External
Relations Law (Hart 2014) p. 47 at p. 67; this view is shared by E. Regelsberger and D. Kugelmann,
‘Art. 275 AEUV’, in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV (C. H. Beck 2012) at para. 10.
106View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 96-100.
107Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, in particular at para. 83 ff.
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circumstances. This is made clear by Protocol No. 8, which demands that
the specificities of Union law be provided for. It is, however, suggested that
Article 6(2) TEU should nonetheless be understood to have some substantive
content in the sense that it equally demands that the basic workings of the
Convention system of judicial review are deemed compatible with the Treaties.
The exclusion of the Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction concerning Common
Foreign and Security Policy measures in the Draft Agreement would create
considerable drafting difficulties. As with mutual recognition, a violation of the
autonomy of the EU legal order must be avoided, i.e. the Court of Human Rights
must not be given jurisdiction to interpret EU law. This constraint means that it
would be difficult to adopt a draft along the following lines: ‘The European Court of
Human Rights has no jurisdiction to review acts of the Union or of the Member
States adopted on under the Common Foreign and Security Policy.’ It is difficult to
conceive of a formulation that would limit the Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction
as required by the Court of Justice and that would at the same time not empower the
Court of Human Rights to interpret the Treaties at least in a superficial fashion.
As an alternative, one could envisage a variation of the prior involvement
mechanism. It is obvious that the Court of Human Rights could review cases in
which the Court of Justice has been involved. Where a member state is taken to that
Court after domestic proceedings have ended and no reference has been made, the
Court of Human Rights could be required to first ask the Court of Justice whether
the complaint concerns an area over which the Court of Justice would have had
jurisdiction. This might reconcile the requirement that the Court of Human Rights
not interpret EU law and the requirement that it not be given jurisdiction over
matters, which the Court of Justice is currently not competent to adjudicate.
However, it would be very difficult to formulate this in practice without creating a
monster, given that the vast majority of cases brought against EUmember states have
no EU law element whatsoever and that the Court of Human Rights must not be
given jurisdiction to even superficially look into the EU Treaties.
This shows that with its objections to the Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction
concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy matters, the Court of Justice has
managed to create a veritable Catch-22. On the one hand accession cannot go
ahead without certain Common Foreign and Security Policy measures being
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights, as otherwise the
specific characteristics of EU law would not be respected. On the other hand, any
attempt to formulate an exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy
measures would violate the autonomy of EU law and thus disrespect its specific
characteristics.108 The only viable solution would thus be Treaty change, for which
108A reservation excluding the review of CFSP measures would probably be met with similar
concerns, as the ECtHR would have jurisdiction to interpret the reservation.
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there are two options. One could either give the Court of Justice jurisdiction over
all Common Foreign and Security Policy measures;109 or the member states could
adopt a slimmed-down version of the ‘notwithstanding Protocol’ discussed above
and clarify Article 6(2) TEU by stating that the Union shall accede to the
Convention notwithstanding the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over
the Common Foreign and Security Policy.110
Is accession still desirable?
By calling ‘the CJEU’s unfavourable opinion […] a great disappointment’, the
president of the Court of Human Rights voiced what many of those involved in
the accession negotiations probably felt.111 As demonstrated, the Court of
Justice’s demands will not be easily satisfied and if they are, the question arises of
whether the concessions that would have to be made might result in exactly the
opposite of what accession was originally meant to achieve: a reduction in the
human rights protection in Europe. Thus it is appropriate to ask whether accession
is still desirable in light of Opinion 2/13.112 In order to arrive at an answer it is best
to compare the level of human rights protection under the Convention after
accession under the conditions set out by the Court of Justice with the current
situation, in which the member states are held responsible in lieu of the EU.
The current situation has been covered in great detail elsewhere,113 so it should
suffice to recall the very basics. The Court of Human Rights decided in Matthews
that the Convention did not prevent EU member states from transferring powers
to the EU ‘provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”’. It thereby
established the responsibility of member states for human rights violations
originating in the EU stating explicitly that ‘Member States’ responsibility
therefore continues even after such a transfer.’114 In the subsequent Bosphorus
decision the Court of Human Rights confirmed this stance in principle, but
relaxed its review for cases in which a member state was acting in accordance with a
strict duty laid down in EU legislation. In such cases, the Court of Human Rights
presumes that a member state has complied with its duties under the Convention
109This is proposed by Krenn, supra n. 85, p. 166 and Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 144.
110A similar modification is discussed by Wessel and Łazowski, supra n. 29, p. 206.
111European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report (2014) 6.
112Peers, for instance, concludes that it has become necessary to oppose accession instead of
supporting it: S. Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, 16
German Law Journal (2015) p. 213 at p. 222.
113E.g. T. Lock, ‘Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European Convention on
Human Rights’, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010) p. 529.
114ECtHR 18 February 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v United Kingdom, para. 32.
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because the human rights protection under EU law had to be considered
equivalent to what the Convention requires. A rebuttal of the presumption is only
possible where the protection in the individual case was manifestly deficient.115
Where a member state is deemed to have had discretion in the implementation of
its obligations under EU law, the presumption does not apply.116 In addition, the
Court of Human Rights only attributes violations to a member state if its
authorities were involved. For instance, in Connolly, the applicant’s complaint
concerned alleged deficits in the proceedings before the Court of Justice, which
the Court of Human Rights did not attribute to the 15 respondent member states
because none of them was at any point involved in the proceedings, which had
been direct actions brought under what is now Article 263(4) TFEU.117
Accession would certainly close the Connolly gap, as in such cases an alleged
violation would be attributed to the EU.118 Moreover, accession would provide an
opportunity for the Court of Human Rights to revisit the Bosphorus presumption.
It has rightly been argued that the Court of Human Rights based the presumption
on a recognition of the fact that the EU is not signed up to the Convention, such
that actions and omissions of member states which are only determined by their
obligations under EU legislation should not normally give rise to responsibility
under the Convention.119 It can thus be maintained that once accession has taken
place, the Court of Human Rights should give up the presumption.120 Accession
would therefore increase the number of potential human rights violations that
could be brought before the Court of Human Rights. In addition, it would also
ensure that violations are attributed to the actual violator, i.e. the EU, and not one
or more of the member states. This would increase the effectiveness of the
protection offered by the Convention system, given that a judgment finding the
EU in breach of the Convention would be immediately binding on it and it would
thus be obliged to remedy the situation, which under the present construction is
not guaranteed. Thus accession must generally be considered to be a positive
115ECtHR 30 June 2005, Case No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland, paras. 154-166; an up-to-date
analysis of subsequent cases can e.g. be found in C. Ryngaert, ‘Oscillating between Embracing and
Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights on Member State Responsibility for
Acts of International Organisations and the Case of the European Union’, 39 European Law Review
(2014) p. 176.
116As was e.g. the case in ECtHR 6 December 2012, Case No. 12323/11, Michaud v France,
para. 113.
117ECtHR 9 December 2009, Case No. 73274/01, Connolly v 15 Member States of the EU.
118See Art. 1(4) DAA.
119E.g. by L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The European Union and the European Convention on Human
Rights: From Sovereign Immunity in Bosphorus to Full Scrutiny Under the Reform Treaty?’, in
I. Boerefijn and J. E. Goldschmidt (eds.), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights,
Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman (Intersentia 2008) p. 295 at p. 303.
120For a more detailed discussion cf. Lock 2010, supra n. 6, p. 797-798.
268 Tobias Lock EuConst 11 (2015)
development for the protection of human rights in the EU. Opinion 2/13
prompts the question whether these potential improvements would on balance be
outweighed by the concessions required by the Court of Justice. The following
discussion is premised on the continued applicability of the current Treaties and
Protocol No. 8, i.e. such that more radical solutions like the adoption of a
‘notwithstanding Protocol’ are not considered.
The modifications to the co-respondent mechanism, the prior involvement
mechanism, and the allocation of responsibility would not affect the level of
human rights protection after accession. Not allowing the Court of Human Rights
to review the plausibility of a co-respondent request would at most lead to more
co-respondent cases than envisaged by the Draft Agreement, which in itself should
not negatively affect an applicant in a given case. The necessary redrafting of the
prior involvement mechanism would potentially result in this mechanism being
available in more cases, which again should not have any harmful effect.121
Finally, the removal of the possibility for the Court of Human Rights to allocate
responsibility in co-respondent cases would have the consequence of joint
responsibility in all such cases. If anything, this would lead to better protection for
the applicant, given that more parties would be bound to remove the violation.
An express provision obliging the Court of Human Rights to respect
reservations made by the member states is potentially prone to deprive
applicants of an opportunity to hold either the member state or the EU
responsible for a human rights violation. Yet this does not mean that the situation
post-accession would be worse than it is now. Under the current arrangement, a
member state cannot be held responsible in a case in which it has made a valid
reservation under the Convention. Thus even where it acted on the basis of EU law
it would not be possible to bring an admissible case to the Court of Human
Rights, so that an express provision urging respect for reservations would merely
confirm the status quo. The same can be said for a coordination of Article 53
Convention with Article 53 of the Charter, which should not affect the level of
human rights protection as it exists at present.
The other necessary changes to the Draft Agreement might prove more
problematic, because solutions that will satisfy the Court of Justice’s wide concept
of autonomy may demand that the drafters cut broader chunks out of the
accession settlement than is desirable from a human rights perspective. It is
recalled that the resolution of the problems concerning Article 344 TFEU,
Protocol No. 16 and mutual recognition would require the drafters to exclude
more potential cases from the Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction than is strictly
necessary to satisfy the Court of Justice’s demands because neatly-tailored
formulations may risk being found contrary to the autonomy of EU law.
121Except for possible delays and increased costs.
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If all inter-party disputes between member states and between member states
and the EU were excluded, the Court of Human Rights would be deprived of one
of its key functions with respect to a large number of parties to the Convention.
Inter-party disputes can be brought in cases of classical diplomatic protection, but
in light of the possibility of individual applications in the Court of Human Rights
this is less relevant. Their main function is thus the judicial assessment of systemic
violations of human rights, which typically occur in the context of a conflict.122
Admittedly, the practical implications of this would be minimal given that few
inter-party disputes have hitherto been brought and only one of them between
two EU member states.123 Nonetheless, the exclusion of such cases would deprive
the Court of Human Rights of its role as a forum for such cases, which might
prompt non-EU state parties to ask for a similar privilege.
Given that Protocol No. 16 is currently not in force, a provision in the Draft
Agreement that prevents EU member states from ratifying it would of course not
lead to a worsening of the human rights protection for the individual compared
with today. It would also be difficult to argue that it would have serious
repercussions for the Strasbourg system as a whole given that, in contrast to
Article 33 of the Convention, Protocol No. 16 cannot be considered an integral
part of the dispute settlement mechanisms available under the Convention.
Hence the Court’s demands regarding Protocol No. 16 must be considered
neutral in this regard.
The requirement to protect the principle of mutual recognition is the most
problematic. As argued above, it would be necessary to completely exclude
member state responsibility for failing to carry out a review of another member
state’s compliance with Convention rights. It would require a far-reaching
exclusion of the Court of Human Rights’ powers, as it would also remove non-
mutual recognition cases from its jurisdiction. Yet even if it were possible to find a
way of only excluding mutual recognition cases, this might result in a deterioration
of the human rights protection compared with today’s standards, in particular
given the absence of an effective EU-internal mechanism to compel member states
to comply with human rights.124 It would be impossible for the Court of Human
Rights to hold a member state of the EU responsible for extraditing a person to
another member state where they would be facing a real risk of, e.g. inhuman and
degrading treatment.
122E.g. ECtHR 18 January 1978, Case No. 5310/71, Ireland v United Kingdom; ECtHR 10 May
2001, Case No. 25781/94, Cyprus v Turkey; ECtHR Preliminary Objections 13 December 2011,
Case No. 38263/08, Georgia v Russia; ECtHR pending, Case No. 20958/14, Ukraine v Russia.
123 Ireland v United Kingdom, n. 123 supra.
124E. Spaventa, ‘A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European
Union after Opinion 2/13’, 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015) p. 35
at p. 51.
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As explained above, the amendment demanded by the Court would prevent
the Court of Human Rights from interfering in Dublin Regulation cases and thus
reduce the human rights protection for asylum seekers. As far as the Brussels
Regulations are concerned, individuals do not currently stand much chance of
succeeding in the Court of Human Rights thanks to the application of the
Bosphorus presumption.125 However, as hinted above, it is unclear whether the
Bosphorus presumption would survive accession. In addition, the Bosphorus
presumption can be rebutted where the protection was manifestly deficient so that
at least in extreme cases, the Court of Human Rights would currently be willing to
intervene. Additionally, the Court of Human Rights could choose to tighten the
Bosphorus presumption and thereby bring more cases within its jurisdiction.126
These options would disappear with accession. Moreover, the amendment would
prevent the Court of Human Rights from reviewing extraditions based on the
European Arrest Warrant. While there has not yet been a successful case in this
regard, the fact that the Court of Human Rights seems to be generally willing to
review extradition decisions based on an European Arrest Warrant,127 coupled
with the fact that the Court of Human Rights has issued pilot judgments
concerning the prison conditions in some EU member states, e.g. Italy128 and
Bulgaria129, shows that there is a high potential for successful challenges in such
scenarios.
This shows that a wholesale exclusion of mutual recognition cases from the
jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights would be highly problematic from a
human rights perspective. This is exacerbated by the need for a broad formulation,
which would result in even more cases being removed from its jurisdiction. Thus
accession under these conditions would negatively affect the human rights
protection in this area of law and would weaken the Strasbourg system as a whole.
Again, non-EU state parties might ask for similar treatment in relations
between them.
As far as the Common Foreign and Security Policy is concerned, it has been
argued above that accession would probably necessitate Treaty change. Should the
drafters find a way of excluding the Common Foreign and Security Policy from
125E.g. in Povse v Austria, supra n. 81.
126This could well happen given the comments by the President of the European Court of Human
Rights referred to in the conclusion.
127See above.
128ECtHR 8 January 2013, Case Nos. 43517/09; 46882/09; 55400/09; 57875/09; 61535/09;
35315/10; 37818/10, Torreggiani and Others v Italy.
129ECtHR 27 January 2015, Case Nos. 36925/10; 21487/12; 72893/12; 73196/12; 77718/12;
9717/13, Neshkov and Others v Bulgaria; the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs also voiced its concerns over the effective protection of human rights
compliance in the European Arrest Warrant system (Draft Report 2013/2109(INL)).
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the Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction without violating the autonomy of the
EU legal order, it must be asked whether this would be desirable from the human
rights perspective. Admittedly, Common Foreign and Security Policy cases over
which the Court of Justice does not currently have jurisdiction are unlikely to raise
human rights concerns in Strasbourg. But a slight possibility of the Court of
Human Rights being seised of a dispute involving for instance an EU mission
operating outside the territory of the EU does exist.130 Compliance with the Court
of Human Rights’ demands might thus reduce the human rights protection
available. Of course, if the Treaties are amended and the Court of Justice is given
jurisdiction over the entire Common Foreign and Security Policy, these concerns
would not exist.
The question whether accession should be pursued under these circumstances
is therefore not an easy one to answer. On the one hand, forgoing accession would
leave intact the odd current situation, where EU law is subject to Strasbourg’s
scrutiny, but the EU cannot be held responsible for it. Plus, the Connolly gap and
the limited protection in Bosphorus-type cases would remain. On the other hand,
accession would certainly lead to a reduction in the human rights protection in the
important and particularly sensitive Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given
that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is a growing area of legislative
activity which is particularly human rights sensitive, this should certainly be
avoided.
Conclusion
This article has tried to gauge under what conditions EU accession to the
Convention can be realised in light of the significant hurdles erected by the Court
of Justice in Opinion 2/13. It has shown that most of the Court of Justice’s
concerns are unwarranted, but nonetheless require a reaction if accession is to go
ahead. Most concerns can be addressed by making changes to the Draft
Agreement, which may however be difficult to negotiate. By contrast, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy issue can probably only be resolved by way
of Treaty change, which may not be politically desirable. The Court of Justice has
thus thrown a huge spanner in the works of accession, which has created great
uncertainty as to whether accession will eventually happen.131 If it ever does, then
it will be with great delay.
One should not forget, however, that the Court of Justice is playing a
dangerous game here. The President of the Court of Human Rights has already
voiced his concerns in unusually strong words by saying that ‘the principal victims
130For details see Lock, supra n. 9, p. 188-190.
131On the political hurdles see the Editorial of the last issue of this review, supra n. 21.
272 Tobias Lock EuConst 11 (2015)
will be those citizens whom this opinion (no. 2/13) deprives of the right to have
acts of the EU subjected to the same external scrutiny as regards respect for human
rights as that which applies to each member State. More than ever, therefore, the
onus will be on the Strasbourg Court to do what it can in cases before it to protect
citizens from the negative effects of this situation.’132 This suggests that the Court
of Human Rights may now be holding the trump cards, as it could easily raise the
standard of its review, especially in those areas pointed out as particularly sensitive
by the Court of Justice. It is certain that the Court of Human Rights will not be
short of opportunities to react.133
132European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report (2014) 6.
133E.g. the pending Grand Chamber decision of Case No. 17502/07, Avotiņš v Latvia concerns
mutual recognition under the Brussels I Regulation.
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